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GIARI Working Paper Vol. 2007-E-5,
January 7th, 2008
2007-E-5
BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOUR AND POLICY CHANGE:
A CASE OF JAPAN’S FINANCIAL MARKET REFORM IN THE 1990S AS AN IMPLICATION FOR THE STUDY OF ASIAN FINACIAL INTEGRATION

Masato Kamikubo
Research Fellow
Global COE Program
Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration
Waseda University

January 7th 2008

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Chapter One: Literature Survey
  • 1.1 Globalisation Studies:
  • 1.2 Conventional Argument of the Reform of Japanese Financial Market in Japan's Political Science:
• Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework
  • 2.1 Previous Studies of Bureaucratic Behaviour:
    • (1) Statism:
    • (2) Public Choice Theory:
    • Toya's Concept of 'Organisational Survival':
    • (3) Principal-Agent Theory:
  • 2.2 Theoretical Framework:
    • (1) Patrick Dunleavy's Bureau-Shaping Model:
    • (2) The Characteristics of Japanese Bureaucracy:
      • Are Japanese Bureaucrats 'Political'?
      • Can Bureaucratic Organisations use Amakudari(Decent from Heaven) to Secure their Members' Loyalty?
      • Bureaucrats' Job Rotation and Overseas Studies
• Chapter Theree:The Reform of Japanese Financial Markets
  • 3.1 The Historical Background of the 'Big Bang' Reform of Japanese Financial Market:
  • 3.2 The Policy Making Process of the Financial Market Reform before Prime Minister Hashimoto's Declaration of the Implementation of 'Big Bang' Reform
    • (1) The Background of Starting Examination of 'Big Bang' Reform:
    • (2) Several Groups Internal and External to MOF:
      • The Ikeo Report
      • The LDP Project Team for Promoting Administrative Reform(PTPAR):
      • Actions of other Ministries and Agencies to Deregulations:
      • Several Groups within MOF:
      • The Banking Bureau and the Financial System Research Committee(FSRC)
      • The Securities Bureau's Proposal of the 'Petit Bang' Reform:
      • The International Financial Bureau's amendment of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law(FEFTCL):
      • The 'Working Team':
  • 3.3 :The Policy Making Process of the Financial Market Reform after Prime Minister Hashimoto's Declaration of Implementation of 'Big Bang' Reform
    • (1) Policy-making Process of Advisory Bodies:
      • The Committe on Foreign Exchange and Other Transactions(CFEOT):
      • The Financial System Research Committee(FSRC):
      • The Securities and Exchange Council(SEC):
      • The Insurance Council(IC)
      • The Business Accounting Council(BAC):
    • (2) The Diet Session:
• Conclusions
• Bibliography

The objective of this paper is to explain the relationship between bureaucratic behaviour and policy change through examining the Japan’s financial market organisational reform in the1990sin order to construct a theoretical framework to research the bureaucratic behaviour in the process of financial integration, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), and lifting tariff barrier in the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Japan and Asian countries. In this paper, the previous models of bureaucratic behaviour, such as ‘authority maximisation model’ and the concept of ‘organisational survival,’ will be rebuilt using a modified version of Patrick Dunleavy’s bureau-shaping model.
The main argument of this paper is that MOF officials play important role in implementation of Japan’s financial market reform in the 1990s. In the policy-making process of Japan’s financial market reform, MOF officials behaved strategically vis-à-vis politicians in order to realize effective administration. This paper tries to revise the conventional arguments of Japanese politics, which Japanese policymakers were opposed to administrative reform in order to protect their own authority, and Japan’s administrative reform was failed.